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6
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA9
NONI GOTTI10
Case No. 3:08-cv-01245-BEN-AJB11
Plaintiff,**REPLY TO OPPOSITION TO**
MOTION FOR REMAND12
**GUILLERMO BENITEZ;
ELIZABETH BENITEZ GARCIA DBA
SAN YSIDRO AUTO SALES; And
DOES 1 THROUGH 10, Inclusive**13
Courtroom: Courtroom Courtroom 3
Judge: The Honorable Roger Benitez
Date: September 22, 2008
Time: 10:30 AM14
Defendants.15
INTRODUCTION16
Plaintiff is enforcing the access laws; she is a Serial Plaintiff and is proud of it.
17
Defendants cry "shakedown" and forum shopping. However, state law predominates here as
18
many of the judges on this Court have ruled. Further, this Court should abstain from hearing this
19
case because damages is a state issue and the state access laws are broader than ADA.20
APPLICABLE LAW21
Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), *42 U.S.C.S. § 12181 et seq.*,
22
provides that no individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and
23
equal enjoyment of any place of public accommodation. *42 U.S.C.S. § 12182(a)*.
24
"Discrimination" is defined as a failure to remove barriers where such removal is readily
25
achievable or, where an entity can demonstrate that the removal of a barrier is not readily
26
achievable, a failure to make accommodations available through alternative methods if such
27
28

1 methods are readily achievable. *42 U.S.C.S. § 12182(b)(2)(iv)-(v)*. Title III provides for injunctive
2 relief as the exclusive remedy for private individuals seeking to enforce the law. *42 U.S.C.S. §*
3 *12188(a)(2)*. Standing is an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement
4 of U.S. Const. art. III. For that reason, both the United States Supreme Court and the United
5 States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit hold that whether or not the parties raise the issue,
6 federal courts are required *sua sponte* to examine jurisdictional issues such as standing. A district
7 court thus has both the power and the duty to raise the adequacy of a plaintiff's standing *sua*
8 *sponte*. The question of standing is not subject to waiver. Moreover, whatever effect the parties'
9 agreement (and the court's acquiescence therein) may have had on the entry of the consent decree,
10 United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit precedent makes clear that a court remains
11 under a continuing obligation to examine its jurisdiction where the parties consent to the
12 settlement of a case but leave for future resolution the matter of attorney's fees. If the district
13 court lacks jurisdiction over the underlying suit, it has no authority to award attorney's fees. A
14 party invoking federal jurisdiction has the burden of establishing that it has satisfied the "case-or-
15 controversy" requirement of U.S. Const. art. III (Article III); standing is a "core component" of
16 that requirement. In order to meet its burden of establishing standing, a party must show three
17 things: First, it must have suffered an injury in fact--an invasion of a legally protected interest
18 which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or
19 hypothetical. Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct
20 complained of. Third, it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be
21 redressed by a favorable decision. Each of the elements of standing must be supported in the
22 same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the
23 manner and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation. The evidence
24 relevant to the standing inquiry consists of the facts as they existed at the time the plaintiff filed
25 the complaint. In evaluating whether a civil rights litigant has satisfied these requirements, the
26 United States Supreme Court has instructed courts to take a broad view of constitutional standing
27 especially where private enforcement suits are the primary method of obtaining compliance with
28

1 the act. With regard to standing, in the context of a suit for injunctive relief, the requirement for
2 injury in fact may only be satisfied where a plaintiff demonstrates a sufficient likelihood that he
3 will again be wronged in a similar way. That is, he must establish a real and immediate threat of
4 repeated injury. A disabled individual who is currently deterred from patronizing a public
5 accommodation due to a defendant's failure to comply with the Americans with Disabilities Act
6 (ADA), 42 U.S.C.S. § 12181 *et seq.*, has suffered "actual injury." Similarly, a plaintiff who is
7 threatened with harm in the future because of existing or imminently threatened non-compliance
8 with the ADA suffers "imminent injury." With regard to actions brought under Title III of the
9 Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C.S. § 12181 *et seq.*, the actual injury rule in
10 cases where the public accommodation being sued is far from the plaintiff's home, courts have
11 found actual or imminent injury sufficient to establish standing where a plaintiff demonstrates an
12 intent to return to the geographic area where the accommodation is located and a desire to visit
13 the accommodation if it were made accessible. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
14 Circuit has explicitly not required ADA plaintiffs to engage in the "futile gesture" of visiting or
15 returning to an inaccessible place of public accommodation in order to satisfy the standing
16 requirement. With regard to actions brought under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act
17 (ADA), 42 U.S.C.S. § 12181 *et seq.*, the attempted use of past litigation to prevent a litigant from
18 pursuing a valid claim in federal court warrants a court's most careful scrutiny. This is particularly
19 true in the ADA context where the law's provision for injunctive relief only removes the incentive
20 for most disabled persons who are injured by inaccessible places of public accommodation to
21 bring suit. As a result, most ADA suits are brought by a small number of private plaintiffs who
22 view themselves as champions of the disabled. For the ADA to yield its promise of equal access
23 for the disabled, it may indeed be necessary and desirable for committed individuals to bring
24 serial litigation advancing the time when public accommodations will be compliant with the
25 ADA. Accordingly, courts must be particularly cautious about affirming credibility
26 determinations that rely on a plaintiff's past ADA litigation. HOLLYNN D'LIL, Plaintiff-
27 Appellant, v. BEST WESTERN ENCINA LODGE & SUITES; ENCINA-PEPPER TREE LTD.;

1 DAVID Z. WEBBER; JEANETTE WEBBER; CECELIA E. VILLINES, Defendants-Appellees.
2 No. 06-55516, UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT, 2008
3 *U.S. App. LEXIS 17168*, November 5, 2007, Argued and Submitted, Pasadena, California, August
4 12, 2008, Filed

5

6 ARGUMENT

7 A. Defendants invoked federal jurisdiction, thus, they have the burden of establishing that it
8 has satisfied the "case-or-controversy" requirement of U.S. Const. art. III (Article III); standing is
9 a "core component" of that requirement.

10 Defendants filed notice of removal thus they invoked federal jurisdiction. This Court has
11 original but not exclusive jurisdiction over ADA suits. *Vacation Vill., Inc. v. Clark County*, 497
12 F.3d 902 (9th Cir. Nev. 2007) ADA suits can be heard by state courts. Defendants invoked
13 federal jurisdiction, thus, they must show Plaintiff's standing.

14

15 B. This Court should remand premised on abstention

16 Amazingly, Defendants' attorney argues that the ADA claim is the primary claim.
17 However, judges on this Court have routinely declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
18 state claims. Damages predominate here. *Pinnock v. Solana Beach Do It Yourself Dog Wash,*
19 *Inc.*, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48256 (S.D. Cal. July 3, 2007) . Plaintiff is not forum shopping;
20 Defendants are.

21 This Court should abstain from hearing this case because there is no "intent to return"
22 requirement in state for injunctive relief like in federal court. Further, there are novel issues of
23 state law as to Civil Code 51, 52 and 54.3 best resolved by the state courts. *Pickern v. Holiday*
24 *Quality Foods Inc.*, 293 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2002). *Botosan v. Paul McNally Realty*, 216 F.3d
25 827, 835 (9th Cir. 2000). *HOLLYNN D'LIL, v. BEST WESTERN ENCINA LODGE &*
26 *SUITES; ENCINA-PEPPER TREE LTD.*; No. 06-55516, CV-02-09506-DSF. *Gunther v. Lin*, 50

1 Cal. Rptr. 3d 317 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006), [the California Supreme Court subsequently denied
2 review of an intermediate appellate court decision that could have provided definitive guidance
3 on whether plaintiffs must prove intentional disability discrimination under the Unruh Act to
4 obtain damages.] For all the reasons referenced above, this Court should abstain from hearing
5 this case because the state claims predominate.

6 C. Defendants failed to show plaintiff in removed action have federal standing to sue

7 Nothing in the Opposition shows Defendants satisfied their burden of proving Plaintiff's
8 standing. Plaintiff will file a First Amended Complaint specifically stating that Plaintiff is not
9 alleging he is substantially limited which is required to bring an ADA claim. Plaintiff is making it
10 clear she is not conceding she is not substantially limited in fact. California Civil Code 51 and
11 54.3 incorporates ADA except for substantially limited. State law may be broader, but not more
12 narrow, than ADA. Duffy v. Riveland, 98 F.3d 447, 457 (9th Cir. Wash. 1996) So California has
13 a more broader state version of ADA and Plaintiff is bringing this case under the state version.

14 Thus, Defendants failed to show Plaintiff has standing to be in federal court.

17 CONCLUSION

18 For all the above reasons, this case should be remanded to state court.

21 Respectfully submitted:

22 PINNOCK & WAKEFIELD, A.P.C.

23 Dated: September 8, 2008

24 By: /s/THEODORE A. PINNOCK, ESQ.
DAVID C. WAKEFIELD, ESQ.
25 Attorneys for Plaintiff

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11 **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**
12 **SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**

13 **NONI GOTTI**

14 3:08-cv-01245-BEN-AJB

15 Plaintiff.
16 v.

17 **PROOF OF SERVICE U.S. MAIL**

18 **GUILLERMO BENITEZ; ELIZABETH**
19 **BENITEZ GARCIA DBA SAN YSIDRO**
20 **AUTO SALES; And**
21 **DOES 1 THROUGH 10, Inclusive,**

22 [Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(e)]

23 Defendants.

24 **STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO**

25 I am employed in the County of San Diego, State of
26 California. I am over the age of 18 and not a party to the
27 within action; my business address is 7851 Mission Center Court,
28 Suite 310 Plaza Centre, San Diego, CA 92108.

On this date, I served the following documents described
as:

1. Reply to Opposition to Motion for Remand

1 The request on **Defendants** stated below in this action by placing
2 the original a true copy thereof enclosed in sealed enveloped
3 addressed as stated below.
4

5 **Spencer C. Skeen**

6 **Procopio Cory Hargreaves & Savitch LLP**
7 **530 B Street, Suite 2100**
8 **San Diego, CA 92101**
(619) 238-1900
Fax: (619) 235-0398
Email: SCS@procopio.com

10 **BY MAIL:** I am readily familiar with the firm's
11 practice of collection and processing correspondence for
12 mailing. Under that practice, it would be deposited with the
13 U.S. Postal Service on the same day with postage thereon fully
14 prepaid, mailed at San Diego, California, in the ordinary course
15 of business. I am aware that on motion of the party served,
16 service is presumed invalid if postal cancellation date or
17 postage meter date is more than one day after date of deposit
18 for mailing in affidavit.

19 **BY PERSONAL SERVICE:** I caused such envelope to be
20 delivered by hand to the offices of the addressee.

22 **BY FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION:** From FAX No. (619) 858-3646
23 to the facsimile numbers listed above on the mailing list. The
24 facsimile machine I used complied with Rule 6 (e), and no error
25 was reported by the machine.

26 **STATE:** I declare under penalty of perjury, under the
27 laws of the State of California, that the foregoing is true and
28 correct.

FEDERAL: I declare that I am employed in the office of a member of the Bar of this Court, at whose direction this service was made.

EXECUTED on September 8, 2008, at San Diego, California.

PINNOCK & WAKEFIELD, A.P.C.

By: /s/THEODORE A. PINNOCK, ESQ.
Attorney for Plaintiff